

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY-EIGHTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 23 May 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA

(Mexico)

GE.67-9328

67-14547

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES
Mr. L. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV
Mr. G. GAVRILOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG
U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL
Mr. J. R. MORDEN

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. WINKLER
Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI
Mr. N. KRISHNAN
Mr. K. P. JAIN
Mr. B. AHMED

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. F. CORREA

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO
Mr. B. O. TONWE

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (continued)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO
Mr. C. GEORGESCU
Mr. A. COROIANU
Mr. C. MITRAN

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. I. VIRGIN
Mr. R. BOMAN
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. R. M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. I. M. PALENYKH
Mr. Y. K. NAZARKIN

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. A. A. SALAM
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT
Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. I. F. PORTER
Mr. R. I. T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER
Mr. C. GLEYSTEN
Mr. C. G. BREAM
Mr. A. F. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I declare open the two hundred and ninety-eighth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. Mr. TRIVEDI (India): At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I should like on behalf of the Indian delegation to offer its warm welcome to you. We have the most pleasant and rewarding memories of working in close co-operation with you during the sessions of the General Assembly, and we are happy that the Indian delegation will again have the privilege in the Eighteen-Nation Committee of continuing that co-operation with the delegation of Mexico under your distinguished leadership.
3. Apart from making a few short comments on some emergent matters, the Indian delegation has not spoken at length during the meetings of the Committee this year. Its only regret on that score has been its inability so far to express formally its welcome to the distinguished leaders and alternates of the delegations of Bulgaria, Burma, Czechoslovakia and Nigeria who have joined us in our task. I should therefore like to take this opportunity of my first intervention in this Committee to convey to them and to their delegations the warm welcome of the Indian delegation and its pledge to full co-operation with them.
4. The Indian delegation is happy that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has now resumed its work after a long and extended recess. In addition to its continuing responsibility to conduct negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, for which it has been established, the Committee's mandate was further reinforced by the twenty-first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which made specific recommendations for its programme of work (ENDC/185). We have therefore before us a heavy agenda and a heavier responsibility.
5. Since the historic session of the Disarmament Commission in April-June 1965, the United Nations has reaffirmed through unanimous and near-unanimous resolution that the task of the Committee remains unchanged. The General Assembly has asked us once again (A/RES/2162(XXI)C, ibid.) to pursue new efforts towards achieving

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substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament and on collateral measures, and in particular on two such measures: an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests. More specifically, the Committee has been called upon to give high priority to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the mandate contained in resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161). On tests, among other things, the Assembly asked the Committee to elaborate without any further delay a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. That was nearly six months ago.

6. The Indian delegation is distressed to find that, despite the continuing exhortations of the United Nations over the years, our Committee has not been able to pursue any special efforts, old or new, in achieving progress, small or substantial, towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The delegations of Sweden, the United Arab Republic and India have offered some constructive ideas in this behalf. Those ideas have not been pursued, nor have they led to any alternative suggestions. The Committee has also made no serious efforts to elaborate a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests underground, despite the demand made of it by the General Assembly to do so without any further delay. It seems to have been forgotten that the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) is an extremely fragile instrument and cannot endure for long if it is not universally adhered to and if its five-year old preambular commitment for disarmament and for prohibiting underground weapon tests remains only a platitude.

7. The delegation of India does not propose to deal this morning with the issues of general and complete disarmament, or with the high-priority problem of suspension by all countries of all tests in all environments, or with several other related and collateral measures of arms restraint, limitation and control. In its first intervention in the Committee this session it would like to concentrate on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which has dominated our discussions for a long time.

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8. At the same time the Indian delegation would emphasize, as it has done in the past, that an international treaty preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons can be a purposeful instrument only if this negotiating Committee of ours conceives of that measure in the over-all and universal concept of disarmament and not as a simple exercise in imposed non-armament of unarmed countries. Progress in evolving a treaty on general and complete disarmament, measures of disarmament of a collateral nature and, above all, cessation of all nuclear weapon tests by all countries -- those are of the utmost urgency, not only because the United Nations has been demanding them, not only because they have their intrinsic benefit in the reduction of tension and strengthening of international peace and security, but also because, as was pointed out by the Disarmament Commission two years ago, they are of crucial value in facilitating agreement on a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

9. What is particularly fundamental is that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will be much easier to negotiate and draft if it is taken not as an isolated measure but as one which forms an integral and co-existent pattern with measures of nuclear restraint and disarmament such as the nuclear weapon test ban and a freeze on all nuclear delivery vehicles. We are all unhappy that there has not been more rapid progress in negotiating a non-proliferation treaty which can be acceptable to all concerned, and particularly to non-aligned non-nuclear nations. As many commentators have emphasized, however, that is due in no small measure to the fact that there is no progress in reaching agreement on such related measures as the nuclear weapon test ban and a freeze on nuclear delivery vehicles.

10. The United Nations General Assembly has laid down categorically as one of the vital principles on which an acceptable treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be based the principle that that treaty "should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament" (A/RES/2028(XX)). That was meant not merely as a pious preambular platitude, not just as an insubstantial incantation to be repeated

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occasionally as a simple magic charm, but as envisaging a concrete programme of specific action. It has to be real and meaningful principle, one which has to form the foundation, the very basis of a non-proliferation treaty.

11. Fairly early during the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations we were all informed that the two super-Powers had come closer together on a matter which concerned them intimately within the context of a non-proliferation treaty: namely, the question of nuclear-sharing arrangements within a military alliance; and we expressed our gratification at that welcome rapprochement. It is the understanding of the Indian delegation that agreement was in fact reached at the beginning of this year between the major Powers and their allies on that particular issue. The Indian delegation would have been happy if, soon after the settlement of that alliance obstacle, the Committee as a whole, consisting of the members of the two alliances and the eight non-aligned delegations, had been able to negotiate the drafting of an adequate and acceptable treaty. If necessary they could have had a drafting committee -- a committee of the whole if you will, for after all that is the mandate of the Committee.

12. The super-Powers and their allies, however, continued to undertake further negotiations among themselves on other matters concerning the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, told us at the first meeting after we reconvened that he hoped that the delegations of the United States and the USSR would soon be able to make a joint recommendation to the Committee (ENDC/PV.297, para. 36).

13. Any progress in the direction of agreement between the United States and the USSR gives us great pleasure. It was during the memorable session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1960 that Jawaharlal Nehru moved a draft resolution on behalf of the delegations of Ghana, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and India, which were then led by the Heads of State or Government of those countries, suggesting a meeting between the leaders of those two great nations. As Nehru said:

"Our idea in sponsoring the resolution was not that the USA and the USSR should discuss international problems or solve them, but that it would help to bring about an element of flexibility in the situation which could be taken advantage of at a later stage."

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14. The Indian delegation sets great store by this element of flexibility and hopes that after this extended period of inter-allied consultations and accommodation the Committee will now revert to the considerations expressed in the memoranda of the non-aligned delegations and in the resolutions of the General Assembly. Without that we shall be unable to fulfil the responsibility entrusted to us, that of negotiating an acceptable and satisfactory international treaty in accordance with the mandate contained in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX).

15. Our urgent task is thus to prepare a draft non-proliferation treaty which the General Assembly would consider as adhering strictly to the principles laid down by it. The draft treaties which are formally before us are the United States draft treaty of August 1965 as amended (ENDC/152/Add.1) and the USSR draft treaty of September 1965 (ENDC/164). The non-aligned delegations have commented on those drafts in the Committee and in the General Assembly. Several non-aligned delegations have also offered constructive comments and specific suggestions during the meetings of the Committee this year.

16. The Indian delegation believes that it is useful at this stage to quote some relevant observations on those draft treaties from the non-aligned memorandum of August 1966. The memorandum states:

"The eight delegations ... recognize that the two draft treaties were submitted before the adoption of resolution 2028 (XX) and, therefore, could not pay full attention to the principles laid down in it.

"The eight delegations regret that it has not so far been possible to arrive at an agreement on a treaty acceptable to all concerned. They are deeply conscious of the danger inherent in a situation without an agreement that prevents proliferation of nuclear weapons. They view with apprehension the possibility that such a situation may lead not only to an increase of nuclear arsenals and to a spread of nuclear weapons over the world, but also to an increase in the number of nuclear weapon Powers, thus aggravating the tensions between States and the risk of nuclear war."

(ENDC/178, p. 2)

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17. The Indian delegation trusts that the joint recommendation promised by Mr. Foster will remedy the lacunae of the earlier drafts and adhere strictly to the principles laid down by resolution 2028 (XX), in particular principles (b) and (c), namely, that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, and that it should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, of nuclear disarmament.

18. The Government of India has long maintained that prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons -- the real prevention of all proliferation of nuclear weapons -- is one of the most urgent and important tasks facing humanity ever since the unfortunate advent of this evil weapon of terror and blackmail. Discussions and negotiations on this and allied subjects have gone on since the days of the Baruch plan and the Gromyko plan in 1946. The relevant issues have been explored in depth in various forums of the United Nations in the past, particularly in the United Nations Sub-Committee on Disarmament in the 'fifties. Then, as today, the emphasis -- to quote the significant phrase in the historic resolution 2028 (XX) -- was on a "balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers". What was then advocated by a few is now being held to be essential by all of us.

19. The Indian delegation has elaborated in detail on many occasions the elements that should be embodied in a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in compliance with the principle of balance and mutuality. It is a treaty of this nature which, in the words of the non-aligned memorandum and the General Assembly resolution, can be "acceptable to all concerned and satisfactory to the international community" and would prevent three facets of proliferation: (i) an increase in nuclear arsenals; (ii) a spread of nuclear weapons over the world; and (iii) an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon Powers. An acceptable and effective treaty, therefore, is one which prohibits existing proliferation among nuclear-weapon Powers, the dissemination of nuclear weapons and weapon technology from one country to another, and further or possible proliferation among hitherto non-nuclear weapon Powers.

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20. The delegation of India is happy that the problem of dissemination now presents no difficulty and that we may soon have an agreed formulation in regard to transfer and receipt of weapons and weapon technology -- a formulation which is balanced and mutual -- providing that no State will transfer nuclear weapons and weapon technology to any other State and that no State will receive weapons and weapon technology from any other State. One hopes at the same time that that joint formulation will deal only with weapons and will not prohibit pursuits of peace.

21. At this stage I should like to say a word or two on the peaceful uses of atomic energy and particularly on the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. The Foreign Minister of India stated in our Parliament on 17 March:

"It is the view of the Indian Government that the non-proliferation treaty should be such as not to impede the growth of nuclear science and technology in the developing countries where the need for such development is great".

On the question of peaceful nuclear explosions the Indian delegation expressed its views fully in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 31 October last year (A/C.1/PV.1436, pp. 11 et seq). As it said then, it agrees with President Truman that "no nation could long maintain or morally defend a monopoly of the peaceful benefits of atomic energy". The civil nuclear Powers can tolerate a nuclear weapons apartheid, but not an atomic apartheid in their economic and peaceful development.

22. The Indian delegation agrees entirely with what the representative of Brazil said at our last meeting:

"Nuclear energy plays a decisive role in this mobilization of resources. We must develop and utilize it in every form, including the explosives that make possible not only great civil engineering projects but also an ever-increasing variety of applications that may prove essential to speed up the progress of our peoples. To accept the self-limitation requested from us in order to secure the monopoly of the present nuclear-weapon Powers would amount to renouncing in advance boundless prospects in the field of peaceful activities." (ENDC/PV.297, para.43)

23. To us this is a matter of vital principle. The Indian delegation does not deny that the technology involved in the production of a nuclear weapon is the

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same as the technology which produces a peaceful explosive device, although a weapon has many characteristics which are not present in a peaceful device. Moreover, as far as fission technology is concerned, it is known to a large number of countries. But that, in any case, is not the issue. As the Indian delegation pointed out in the United Nations last year, technology in itself is not evil. Dynamite was originally meant for military use. Aeronautics, electronics, even steel fabrication -- those are technologies which can be used for weapons as well as for economic development. That does not mean, therefore, that only the poor and developing nations should be denied all technology for fear that they may use it for military purposes.

24. Centuries of history have proved to us that the use that people make of their skills is entirely a matter of will. It is completely wrong to deduce that what is evil is science and technology, skill and progress. Jawaharlal Nehru said in the Indian Parliament as early as in May 1954:

"In the last generation or two there have been certain explorations of the remotest frontiers of human knowledge which are leading us to many strange discoveries and strange consequences. Max Planck's Quantum Theory and, later on, Albert Einstein's Theory of Relativity changed the whole conception of the universe. Soon came the atom bomb with its power to kill. The human mind and human efforts are unleashing tremendous powers without quite knowing how to control them. They cannot be controlled by a mere desire or demand for banning them. One of the political problems of the day is how to approach this problem of control which is of vital consequence. Such an approach presupposes some measure of lessening of tension in the world, some measure of mutual confidence on the part of great nations, some agreement to allow each country to live its life".

Referring specifically to the question of control he said:

"Let us understand, without using vague phrases and language, what it means. Certainly we would be entitled to object to any control which is not exercised to our advantage".

He added that India accepted control in common with other countries --

"... provided we are assured that it is for the common good of the world and not exercised in a partial way and not dominated over by certain countries, however good their motives".

25. In other words, to quote a phrase which a great Power used twenty years ago in the context of a comprehensive plan for the control of atomic energy, we are not interested in the establishment of an atomic commercial super-monopoly.

26. As the Indian delegation stated in the United Nations General Assembly last year, it recognizes that such explosions must be adequately safeguarded. The safeguards must apply equally to all nations, and the Indian delegation is prepared to work with others in evolving a system of regulation which could be accepted by all States. As Ambassador Correa da Costa pointed out at our meeting on 18 May, the solution of the problem must not be sought in the renunciation of the sovereign right of unrestricted development of the new source of energy by some countries only, and mainly by the developing countries (ENDC/PV.297, para.47). We must not throw the baby away with the bath-water.

27. Coming back to the question of the treaty, the two other facets of proliferation are equally amenable to a balanced and mutual solution similar to that of the problem of dissemination -- a solution which provides for obligations and responsibilities of nuclear-weapon Powers and non-nuclear-weapon Powers alike, as repeatedly demanded by the United Nations. An article in the treaty stipulating that no country should henceforth manufacture nuclear weapons would not only satisfy the criterion of balance and mutuality and of the assumption of responsibilities and obligations by both the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapon Powers, but also solve the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons correctly and comprehensively. It would also obviate other pitfalls, both political and mechanical, particularly those relating to control, which would be bound to arise in a discriminatory and unbalanced treaty.

28. The Indian delegation has stressed repeatedly that future proliferation or further proliferation is only the consequence of existing or continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon Powers. Disregard to this self-evident truth led to proliferation in the past, and we can disregard it now only at our peril.

29. History tells us that what is described as further proliferation or further spread of nuclear weapons took place in the past only among a few countries belonging to military alliances. Those countries have indicated the reasons which led to their decision to embark on a nuclear weapons programme. It is our duty as members of a group of experts to investigate those reasons and to ensure that in the solution we propose we eliminate them as far as possible.

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30. The powerful members of military alliances which went in for further proliferation in the past have given two reasons for their action -- status or prestige, and national security. First, they wanted to be at the top table. They felt somehow or other that possession of nuclear weapons gave them prestige and power, authority and influence. Secondly, they said that they could best safeguard their security by an independent nuclear deterrent. If, therefore, any serious efforts are to be made by this Committee to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons they must be directed towards meeting those two considerations of prestige and security.

31. Unfortunately, no real or effective effort is being made to deny prestige to possession of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, reports indicate that the nuclear-weapon Powers are being given an overwhelmingly privileged position in the propositions which are being elaborated these days. As time goes on, the nuclear-weapon Powers are apparently contemplating ever-increasing provisions of discrimination. The unbalanced aspects of the earlier draft treaties are being embellished further, and attempts are being made to construct the most perfect structure of imperfection. The nuclear-weapon Powers now want comprehensive controls over the peaceful activities of civil nuclear Powers, without, of course, any control whatsoever over their own activities, peaceful or warlike. They even want to prohibit the civil nuclear Powers from undertaking peaceful explosions purely for their economic development even if such peaceful pursuits take place under international supervision.

32. All these projects will, however, have just the opposite effect. A discriminatory treaty which gives a privileged licence to the existing nuclear-weapon Powers to proliferate at will and which heaps ever-increasing prohibitions on non-nuclear Powers will in itself be the strongest incentive to a new country to embark on a nuclear weapons programme.

33. The second consideration, that of security, which was advanced by the existing nuclear-weapon Powers to explain why they embarked on a nuclear-weapons programme, is even more germane. As far as the question of prestige is concerned, countries like India would be happier with the prestige of a civil nuclear Power. However, security is a much more vital consideration.

34. To be sure, this is not a matter which concerns only the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The terms of reference of our Committee stipulate that all measures that we negotiate "should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all" (ENDC/5, para. 5). Even apart from measures of disarmament, however, the very facts of political life of today demand that nations, and particularly a nation like India which is exposed to nuclear blackmail, take full account of the needs of national security. The question of security is a much wider issue and is relevant irrespective of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

35. The great Powers, which possess in their ever-expanding armouries the most destructive power ever known to mankind, have not yet, however, given any effective and credible consideration to the security needs of the non-nuclear countries, and particularly the non-aligned countries. Referring specifically to the question of a non-proliferation treaty, these powerful nuclear-weapon nations say that the non-nuclear nations would safeguard their security by forswearing nuclear weapons for ever in the midst of mushrooming proliferation by the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves.

36. This is, however, not the precept which they have themselves followed, and in fact they rejected it for themselves when it was time for them to decide. Moreover, as we know, various disarmament forums have been discussing questions of disarmament, and particularly of nuclear disarmament, since 1946. To divers proposals put forward on the subject from time to time, either by one side or the other or by non-aligned nations like India, the answer given by the great Powers has been that they cannot accept this or that proposal of nuclear restraint or reduction because it would adversely affect their security. But when they address themselves to non-nuclear Powers, the nuclear-weapon Powers argue that nuclear weapons provide no security and that the best way the non-nuclear nations can safeguard their security is to sign a discriminatory treaty -- a treaty which will at the same time give unfettered licence to five Powers to proliferate.

37. On the other hand, the General Assembly of the United Nations has advocated the right approach and has laid down two basic principles: namely, that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of

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the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers and should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament, more particularly nuclear disarmament (A/RES/2028 (XX)). As the Indian delegation has pointed out before, this can be achieved by adequate and effective provisions in an appropriate treaty, and I should like to recapitulate them at the risk of repetition.

38. On the question of dissemination, a balanced provision would require that no State shall transfer nuclear weapons or weapon technology to another State, and that no State shall receive such weapons or technology from another State. Similarly, on the question of proliferation, a balanced article would stipulate that no State shall henceforth manufacture nuclear weapons. This would incidentally obviate all invidious distinctions of prestige between States possessing nuclear weapons and those not possessing them, and curious concepts like the setting of dates for the duration of the nuclear-weapon era or for the closing of the list of membership of an exclusive club.

39. That still leaves the problem of what the representative of Brazil described as the possession in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon Powers of "a capacity for nuclear strike many times superior to their security needs -- the 'overkill'..." (ENDC/PV.297, para.46). It is a matter of vital concern to India that one of the lesser nuclear Powers, in particular, is feverishly building up its arsenal of weapons and developing its delivery capability.

40. Those immense stockpiles of mass destruction in the possession of nuclear-weapon Powers pose a real threat to the security of nations, and a non-proliferation treaty of universal arms restraint cannot in itself reduce that threat or its potentiality for blackmail unless it also embodies a provision dealing with those menacing stockpiles. It is for that reason that the General Assembly has maintained that one of the basic principles of a non-proliferation treaty is that it is a step towards nuclear disarmament. As has been pointed out by many non-aligned delegations, a non-proliferation treaty must accordingly embody an article of solemn obligation under which the States possessing nuclear weapons would negotiate a meaningful programme of reduction of existing stockpiles of weapons and their delivery systems. This provision cannot be merely a pious preambular platitude like the unfulfilled "determination" in the four-year-old partial test-ban treaty.

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41. Increasingly references are being made these days to the question of control and means of safeguarding observance of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The delegation of India agrees with the principle of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) that there should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty. These provisions must necessarily be balanced and mutual and should apply to the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers alike.
42. As the Committee is aware, the question of control has been debated right from the beginning of international discussions on matters concerning atomic energy and disarmament. The problem then debated is as relevant today as it was at that time. The Government of India has always believed that control and disarmament must go together. There can never be a question of one coming before the other, particularly if it is to be genuine disarmament and genuine control.
43. The second consideration that the Government of India has continued to advance throughout is that the control should be universal and that it should be exercised in a non-discriminatory and objective manner; otherwise, as the Indian representative stated in the Preparatory Commission of the International Atomic Energy Agency, it would be tantamount to a new form of economic colonialism.
44. It is in the context of those two considerations that we have to view the question of a control provision in a non-proliferation treaty. One thing is certain: control can never be used merely as an instrument for imposing non-armament on unarmed countries nor, as the leader of the Indian delegation to the International Atomic Energy Agency said in the General Conference last year, "as a lever for achieving the political objectives of non-proliferation".
45. I should like to quote in this context one of the greatest living experts on disarmament matters, the Nobel Peace Prize winner Mr. Philip Noel-Baker. He said:
- "In any case the Western Governments cannot leave things where they are today. Either the 'safeguards' of IAEA inspection will become the instrument of control over nuclear disarmament for the world at large; or it may soon become a farce. It cannot be used to keep the non-nuclear Powers disarmed, while the nuclear Powers continue to pile up or to retain great stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons, large and 'small'. The purpose of IAEA, and the purpose of the cut-off which the western governments propose, is to demilitarize atomic energy; either that purpose must be fully and speedily achieved, or IAEA and the hopes built upon it will all fail."

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46. The Indian delegation realizes that control is a complex problem. Many of the complexities need not arise, however, in the context of a genuine treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If all of us, and particularly the big Powers, agree that there should be a provision in the treaty dealing with safeguards and control, we must eschew all notions of discrimination and provide for objective measures which apply equally to all. An adequate treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will prohibit the manufacture of nuclear weapons by all States. Whatever provisions are necessary, therefore, to ensure that the production of all fissile material by all States is used henceforth only for peaceful purposes will thus be in full conformity with General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). What is more, we should have fulfilled one of the terms of reference of the very first resolution of the United Nations, resolution 1 (I), namely "control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes".

47. We are a negotiating Committee and the Indian delegation trusts that the views expressed by it will be considered fully by all delegations, and particularly by the Great Powers, during these negotiations. Earlier I quoted a statement made by our Foreign Minister in the Indian Parliament on 17 March. I should like to continue that quotation. Mr. Chagla went on to say:

"While welcoming a meeting of minds between the United States and the USSR, which in itself is a good augury, the Government of India hope that after the draft treaty on nuclear non-proliferation is presented to the ENDC it will be thoroughly discussed and that the treaty as finally agreed would take a shape and form acceptable to all countries which are represented on the Committee, and, subsequently, to the international community in general. A satisfactory agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will have to take into account the peculiar circumstances in which certain countries are placed."

48. Mr. WINKLER (Czechoslovakia): First of all, Mr. Chairman, I should like to join previous speakers in welcoming you among us as the representative of Mexico and to express the conviction of my delegation that your participation in the Committee's work will greatly contribute to our deliberations and to their success. May I add how glad I am personally to be able to resume the close co-operation which I had the pleasure and privilege of maintaining with you years ago in various United Nations bodies?

49. I should like also to thank the representative of India, Ambassador Trivedi, for his words of welcome extended today to my delegation and to me.

50. The present tense international situation has caused justified concern in the entire world. The continuing escalation of United States aggression in Vietnam -- of which new stepped-up ground action taken in recent days and directed already against the demilitarized zone and intensified bombing of densely-populated areas give ample evidence -- shares decisively in a further aggravation of the tension and constitutes a continuous and constantly-growing threat to world peace. There have been other events elsewhere in the world also which do not contribute in any way to improvement of the atmosphere in general. The main sources of unrest and tension have by no means been eliminated in Europe either.

51. In this situation any step that would contribute towards improving the atmosphere in the world, and towards easing international tension, would play a positive role. We have no doubt that an early conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be a significant step forward in that direction.

52. At the end of March we left this room aware of the difficulties which had to be overcome if we were to achieve that objective. The obstacles which stood in the way of working out the text of a non-proliferation treaty acceptable to all participants in our sessions and to other countries have not disappeared. Despite all the efforts exerted during the last recess, they could not be eliminated. It is therefore necessary to continue our unremitting activity and try to find a way of surmounting them. It is even more important since -- as has been pointed out here many times in the past -- time is not our ally in this matter and delays might give rise to new complications making it ever more difficult for us to achieve our objective -- that is, to sign an effective treaty on the prohibition of a further spread of nuclear weapons under adequate international control.

53. Nobody can deny that the treaty continues to be highly topical and desirable. The reasons which prompted the inscription of this item on the disarmament agenda and placed it in the fore of the tasks faced by our Committee have not ceased to exist nor have they been weakened by past developments. On the contrary, their importance is ever more evident. If today a number of States lack only one tiny technological step to cross the line separating them from the status of a nuclear-weapon State, then in the foreseeable future that number will be much higher.

(Mr. Winkler, Czechoslovakia)

Therefore it is extremely urgent to accept measures that would block the avalanche which would otherwise be on the move in the undesirable and, from the point of view of world peace, the very dangerous direction of unlimited and unregulated manufacture of nuclear weapons.

54. At present the generation of 8,000 megawatts of electrical energy from nuclear sources produces as side products some 4,000 kilogrammes of plutonium. The forecast of experts gives the figure of 10,000 kilogrammes of plutonium in 1970 and 100,000 kilogrammes in 1980. Almost one-third of the over-all production in 1970 will be in States not possessing nuclear weapons. The same experts tell us that only five kilogrammes of plutonium are needed for the manufacture of one atomic bomb. This means that the given quantity of plutonium would be sufficient for the manufacture of 2,000 A-bombs a year in 1970 and 20,000 A-bombs a year in 1980. This unprecedented development of nuclear power and everything that goes with it only underlines the urgency of such international regulations as would channel it to the benefit and not the detriment of mankind. The proposed non-proliferation treaty would be precisely such a regulation. It is evident from those figures that any delay in its conclusion might within a very short time have consequences that would be beyond any remedy.

55. The deliberations of the past years have crystallized into the basic questions which the treaty should and could regulate. The principles on which it should be based have been formulated in several United Nations General Assembly resolutions very often quoted here, the latest being those adopted at the twentieth and twenty-first General Assembly sessions which enjoyed the practically unanimous support of the United Nations Member States. There has been full justification of the demand that the treaty must not allow the spread of nuclear weapons in any way, either direct or indirect, and that it must not leave any loop-holes that would enable nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States to increase the numbers of those possessing nuclear weapons. Such an arrangement would guarantee that the present state of affairs, which is highly alarming in itself -- a state of affairs wherein nuclear weapons are at the disposal of the existing five nuclear-weapon Powers in excessive numbers -- would not get worse. No doubt such a step would contribute to the improvement of the general atmosphere in the world, to increase security both on a world-wide scale and in individual regions.

56. In the interest of non-nuclear-weapon States justly striving for a maximum safeguarding of their security, we regard it as right that the treaty should include provisions prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States on whose territories nuclear weapons are not located. The realization of the treaty would, we are convinced, be in the interest of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. In this respect the non-proliferation treaty would play a positive role; moreover, there is justification for supposing that it would constitute a starting-point for the solution of other problems in the field of disarmament, and more particularly nuclear disarmament, thus smoothing the way towards the main and ultimate objective -- that is, general and complete disarmament.

57. Our generation has entered the atomic age. The use of nuclear power in all spheres of human activity will grow, and this growth will be markedly manifested, particularly in the years to come. We may identify ourselves with the words of the chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Seaborg, who said the following of this trend:

"While experts might disagree on the time scale, there is no question that man's unending appetite for energy will in due course exhaust the irreplaceable assets of chemical energy stored in fossil fuels, leaving as the only practical alternative known to us today the energy released by the process of nuclear fission. ... Long before that stark necessity arises economics will dictate a growing reliance on nuclear fuels in meeting new energy requirements."

58. Naturally, we cannot go against that stream. On the contrary, it is necessary to facilitate it in all possible ways. That does not mean, however, that the endeavour to provide the widest possible scope for peaceful uses of nuclear energy should become an obstacle to the prohibition of military uses of the results of nuclear research; and particularly it should not become an obstacle to concluding the non-proliferation treaty. The treaty would not limit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in any way. It would not be a strait-jacket for them. No activity in the field of peaceful research, or in industrial and commercial uses of nuclear energy on a national or international scale, would be affected in any way by the non-proliferation treaty. On the contrary, we think that the treaty would open new avenues to broad international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses. The

non-nuclear-weapon States would be relieved of the heavy burden connected with the activities in the field of the military uses of nuclear power, and could channel all their resources fully into peaceful uses.

59. With regard to safeguarding the efficiency of the non-proliferation treaty, it seems justified to demand that the treaty should include an adequate system of verification which would ensure that the contracting States duly met the obligations assumed by them in signing the treaty. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic proceeds from the assumption that the international control applied within the framework of the non-proliferation treaty should be unified -- that is, that it would have to be generally and universally applied and obligatory upon all non-nuclear-weapon States. We believe that the principles to guide such control have been formulated very aptly in previous statements of various delegations here in the Committee, and in particular in the statement made by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Ambassador Khallaf, at the meeting on 16 March (ENDC/PV.294, paras 2 et seq)

60. We believe that in the present circumstances the control might be exercised through the application of the International Atomic Energy Agency system of safeguards the status of which was adopted by the States Members of the Agency in 1965. Those members included my country which, a year later at the tenth General Conference of the Agency in Vienna, like the Polish People's Republic and the German Democratic Republic, expressed its readiness to accept the Agency guarantees for its nuclear installations if Western Germany and other non-nuclear members of NATO acted in the same way. Given the goodwill of all countries concerned, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic sees no obstacles that might stand in the way of a general acceptance of an effective international control within the non-proliferation treaty in the form of the Agency's system of safeguards, the more so since the application of that system would not affect in any way the existing partial intergovernmental arrangements in the field of peaceful nuclear co-operation.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 298th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Jorge Castañeda, representative of Mexico.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India and Czechoslovakia.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 25 May 1967, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.